2002 parliamentary elections in Ukraine by - & -
2002 Pa r l i a m e n t a ry Elections 
in Ukraine 
Events, Results, Consequences
( e x t r a c t )
On 31 March 2002, parliamentary elections were
held in Ukraine. As expected, they were a major
success for the centrist-rightist coalition focused
around former Prime Minister Viktor Yuschenko.
The communists emerged significantly weaker
from the vote, and the Òparty of powerÓ achie-
ved a poor result. Yet, due to the mixed electoral
law (half of the deputies were elected in single-
mandate districts), the latter block, firmly sup-
ported by President Leonid Kuchma, resulted as
the main force in Parliament.
The results of particular parties and blocks were
as follows: Viktor YuschenkoÕs Block received
23.57% of votes and 112 seats, the Communist
Party of Ukraine Ð 19.98% of votes and 66 seats,
the ÒFor One UkraineÓ block Ð 11.77% of votes
and 101 seats, Yulia TymoshenkoÕs Block Ð 7.26%
of votes and 22 seats, the Socialist Party of Ukra-
ine Ð 6.87% of votes and 22 seats, and the Social
Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) Ð 6.27% of
votes and 24 seats. This shows how the mixed
electoral regulations favour ÒFor One UkraineÓ
and act against YuschenkoÕs block. One should
note, however, that the latter gained the sup-
port of less than one quarter of voters. 
Had the elections been held on the basis of pro-
portional electoral regulations then, assuming
the results were the same, ÒOur UkraineÓ would
have ended up with 139 seats, the Communist
Party Ð 119 seats, ÒFor One UkraineÓ Ð 71 seats,
TymoshenkoÕs block Ð 43 seats, the Socialist Par-
ty Ð 41 seats, and the Social Democratic Party Ð
37 seats. Although the electoral tactics of the
main political forces would have been different
if the electoral law had been proportional, inevi-
tably influencing the results of the vote, the si-
mulation cited above gives us an idea of how the
Parliament of Ukraine would look, had it been
elected under proportional regulations. 
The elections were a great success for Viktor
Yuschenko, who became the main candidate for
the 2004 presidential elections. At the moment,
Yuschenko has no serious rival, but two years re-
main until these elections take place. The suc-
cess of the ÒFor One UkraineÓ coalition was ear-
ned mainly in single-mandate districts, owing to
support granted by voters to local politicians
and business people, and as a result of numero-
us, frequently serious abuses. It was also mainly
in the single-mandate districts that the Commu-
nist Party faced their defeat: under proportional
regulations, their results were slightly lower
than four years ago. Finally, it is important that
the elections were a success for the two forma-
tions of the firmly anti-presidential opposition:
the Socialist Party of Ukraine and Yulia Tymo-
shenkoÕs Block. Both became targets of fierce di-
screditing campaigns which, it seems, made
them even more popular. Together with the Pro-
gressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, which did not
make it into Parliament, UkraineÕs radical oppo-
sition received a total of ca. 17% of votes. 
The elections caused a marked consolidation of
the Ukrainian political scene: fewer groups ma-
de it into Parliament, and the distance between
those that did and those that failed was much
greater than it had been four years ago. Still, the
largest two groups are disjointed inter-party co-
alitions; hence the degree of consolidation being
smaller than the election results could suggest.
The elections confirmed that, on the one hand,
there still exists a deep political split in Ukraine
and, on the other, that this split is shifting: it
used to be an East vs. West division, but it is
now changing into a North vs. South division.
This split also reflects the division of Ukraine in-
to zones dominated by the centrist-rightist gro-
ups and the socialists (west, centre, and north-
east) and the communists (south). Parties of the
pro-presidential centre are not dominant in any
of UkraineÕs regions, but they hold strong posi-
tions in every region except for the west.
The elections took place a year ago and have,
since that time, been overshadowed by subsequ-
ent events such as the new political crisis con-
nected with the shaping of the distribution of
power in Parliament and new attacks against
president Kuchma, as well as the tarring of Ukra-
ineÕs international image following its alleged
breach of the embargo on arms supplies to Iraq.
Even so, the importance of the elections has not
diminished, not only because the parliament
that emerged from the vote will influence deve-
lopments in Ukraine over the next four years (in-
cluding in the course of the presidential campa-
ign) but also, and, perhaps, most importantly,
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because the parliamentary elections have reve-
aled the state of Ukrainian social awareness and
political preferences in a manner that is not ac-
cessible to any polls. 
The picture that emerges from an in-depth ana-
lysis of election results presents the Ukrainians
as a much more politically mature society than
commonly believed. Most voters support change
within the frames of constitutional order. It
turns out that the massive positive and negative
(discrediting) propaganda messages in the me-
dia generated surprisingly little effect. Ukraine
chose democracy: evolutionary change within
the already established system, in which the ru-
ling group and the opposition compete. Ukra-
inians also voted for change and against stagna-
tion (there is a separate problem in that they are
deeply divided as to the desired direction of such
change). We must not forget that Ukrainian de-
mocracy is still very young, and that this was
only the third time the country witnessed parlia-
mentary elections held under democratic electo-
ral regulations.
For the first time in the history of UkraineÕs par-
liament, the new Verkhovna Rada represents
a clear-cut political situation: there is the pro-
presidential centre made up of numerous frac-
tions that will co-operate on key issues, and the
anti-presidential opposition that includes the
left wing and the right wing blocks. The centre
consists in fractions originating from ÒFor One
UkraineÓ and the social democrats. Right wing
opposition is formed by Yulia Ty m o s h e n-
koÕs Block and ÒOur UkraineÓ, and left wing op-
position includes the Socialist and Communist
parties. While ÒOur UkraineÓ and the Commu-
nist Party comprise ÒconstructiveÓ opposition
capable of co-operating with the presidentÕs te-
am on certain issues, the Socialist Party and
Yulia TymoshenkoÕs Block are radical uncompro-
mising opponents. Viktor Yuschenko is particu-
larly unwilling to engage in any political co-ope-
ration with Yulia Tymoshenko.
This kind of parliament will not be able to form
a coalition capable of carrying out the constitu-
tional reform proposed by Leonid Kuchma (the
goal of which is to further strengthen the presi-
dentÕs office), nor one capable of impeaching the
president or being able to carry out a reform of
the entire governmental system and introduce
a parliamentary cabinet system. President Kuch-
ma may feel secure, but the election results will
inevitably force him to revise his political strate-
gy and carefully consider the candidate that he
will support in the presidential elections that
will take place in autumn 2004. 
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U k r a i n e Õ s Pa r l i a m e n t a ry System
after the Elections 
The dominant force in UkraineÕs Verkhovna Ra-
da, elected in March 2002, are the deputies of
ÒOne UkraineÓ, a fraction of the pro-presidential
centre. ÒOne UkraineÓ has refused to admit any
of the oppositionÕs representatives (either from
the right or left wings) into the parliamentÕs pre-
sidium, but has accepted opposition-appointed
heads of many parliamentary commissions. Vik-
tor YuschenkoÕs ÒOur UkraineÓ, which has been
the largest parliamentary fraction since June, at-
tempted to proclaim itself the centre of the par-
liamentary majority, but its policy was awkward
and inconsistent, and the main success of this
club was that it didnÕt break up. Viktor Yuschen-
koÕs moves have been particularly incoherent
and they undermined the image of Yuschenko as
UkraineÕs future leader, created throughout the
course of the electoral campaign. 
In autumn, the main oligarchic groups and their
representative fractions (ÒOne UkraineÓ, which
proved to be a useless instrument, was dissolved
in June), reached a compromise with the presi-
dent. It was agreed that the new prime minister
should be a Donetsk clan representative (Viktor
Yanukovych), and that the Dnipropetrovsk clan
should appoint the president of the National
Bank of Ukraine (this position went to Serhij Ti-
h i p ko). The Kyiv clan obtained the Pre s i-
dentÕs Administration (Viktor Medvedchuk was
appointed in spring) and a considerable number
of parliamentary commissions. The pre s i-
dentÕs interests in the government are to be pro-
tected by Mykola Azarov, former Head of the Sta-
te Tax Administration. This compromise Òpacka-
geÓ was designed to secure the shares of the ma-
in oligarchic clans in the power and the presi-
dentÕs strong position as mediator.
Implementation of these agreements was une-
xpectedly re n d e red difficult by ÒOur UkraineÓ,
which decided to defend Volodymyr Stelmakh,
the president of the central bank, and its partici-
pation in commissions. When the parliament
passed the respective resolutions ÒOur UkraineÓ,
together with other opposition clubs, caused
a p a r l i a m e n t a ry obstruction and, towards the
end of 2002, forced the cancellation of the re s o l u-
tion on the appointment of commission leaders.
Still, this was a defeat: Yu s c h e n ko, who spent all
autumn trying to persuade the parliamentary re-
p resentations of the Donetsk and Dnipro p e t ro v s k
clans to form an alliance with him rather than
with Medvedchuk, was ultimately pushed to-
w a rds the opposition, which he had tried to avo-
id. On the other hand, the restoration of the ori-
ginal division of parliamentary commissions was
M e d v e d c h u k Õ s first serious failure since beco-
ming Head of the Pre s i d e n t Õ s Administration. 
Pa r l i a m e n t Õ s new majority is unstable. It
wonÕt support the government and the presi-
dent on all matters. Yet the crisis described be-
low was a growth crisis, and UkraineÕs parlia-
mentary system emerged from it all the stron-
ger. The main oligarchic clans, which now aim to
legalise their interests, are ever more willing to
settle their business in Parliament rather than
through lobbying with the PresidentÕs Admini-
stration. Since the term of office the new Ver-
khovna Rada expires in 2006, the new president
will have to deal with an already firmly establi-
shed parliament. 
The PresidentÕs Administration, a body that is
not projected in the constitutional system of sta-
te bodies and has enormous influential power
over other bodies, is a relic of the soviet system
Ð it has stepped into the role of functional suc-
cessor of the Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party. A substantial group of oligarchs are
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Ad-
ministrationÕs omnipotence, and especially with
the power of its present head, Viktor Medved-
chuk. This may lead to a diminishment of the
AdministrationÕs influence, but its future fate
will lie in the hands of the new president.
The Ukrainian democracy is still predominantly
a system of institutions and procedures that lack
the base of democratic attitudes and habits: the-
se are not easily found either among the politi-
cal elite (this also refers to pro-Western groups),
or the voters. While it is possible to establish in-
stitutions by decree, attitudes and habits need
to develop and take root on the basis of the func-
tioning of formal mechanisms (institutions) of
parliamentary democracy. This takes time: the
process may require decades, if not entire gene-
rations. But even today and even among the po-
litical elite, the support for democratic mechani-
sms in Ukraine is strong enough to prevent a po-
tential turn towards authoritarian rule.
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